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Historians of science have extensively examined the ultimately affirmative reception of Nicolaus 
Copernicus’s heliocentric astronomy in the Scientific Revolution it helped bring about. Yet here remains 
something of a puzzle. Namely, what motivated Copernicus to propose an alternative to the Ptolemaic 
geocentric theory in the first place? Ptolemy’s system had been accepted for over a millennium, 
unaltered in essence and successively refined in application since first set down in the second century. 
Yet, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Copernicus saw Ptolemaic astronomy as somehow 
inadequate. There was some problem with the geocentric system that Copernicus took it upon himself 
to solve. What was that problem? 
 
On many interpretations, theoretical innovation is motivated only by failures at the interface between 
the theory (taken as a whole) and experience, so new theories are generated only in the face of 
anomalous or recalcitrant phenomena. Most famously, this is the view of Thomas Kuhn, who argued 
that new scientific “paradigms” are adopted when anomalies overwhelm predominant theories. But this 
view is also perhaps the most enduring legacy of twentieth-century empiricism in the philosophy of 
science. It was a core tenet of logical positivism that theories succeed insofar as they “save the 
phenomena,” and even a postpositivist like Quine held that science is tested by the “tribunal of sense 
experience.” 
 
However, Copernicus cannot have been motivated by empirical failure, since the corpus of astronomical 
observations he sought to accommodate had remained largely unaltered since the Alfonsine tables were 
compiled in the thirteenth century. There was no outstanding, extensive set of problematic 
observations, either newly-discovered or slowly accumulated, that demanded novel explanation. 
Indeed, even in the end, the Copernican system did not appreciably improve predictive accuracy over its 
predecessors. Copernicus, moreover, was only one of several astronomers of his generation to propose 
alternatives to the Ptolemaic system. Copernicus’s work also generated a great deal of interest even 
before the publication of De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium in 1543. Thus, Copernicus’s 
contemporaries attributed, even before it was widely understood, great significance in his view, which is 
to say they took it seriously as a possible solution to some problem. Again, what was that problem? 
 
Since antiquity, natural philosophers had ascribed uniform rotations to the heavens. This motion, it was 
explained, resulted from the near perfection of the celestial bodies themselves. However, the motions 
of the planetary bodies are not uniform. They exhibit several “anomalies”—irregular digressions from 
uniform circular motion. This, then, was the astronomical project: how to coordinate that which could 
be explained—uniform rotation— with the irregular appearances of the heavens. This “coordination” 
was to be carried out by a descriptive system. The celestial phenomena were to be represented in such 
a way that the explanatory principle at work could account for all of the elements of the representation. 
To put this another way, the phenomena had to be formulated into explananda that could be linked to 
the available explanans. The physical explanation would then apply to the description, and the 
description would convey the explanation to the observed phenomena. A successful astronomical 
theory, then as now, would enable the application of explanatory power from the physical principles to 
the observed phenomena via the description of those phenomena. 
 
By the same token, an astronomical theory could fail at two distinct interfaces: that between 
phenomena and description and that between description and explanation. In the first case, the 
descriptions of phenomena derivable from the theory—e.g., the predictions generated by the theory—
fail to correspond to experience. This is an empirical failure. In the second case, the phenomena are 
described in such a way that they cannot be satisfactorily explained. The physical principles, as 
explanantia, do not lead to the descriptions, as explananda. This is an explanatory failure. 
 
Ptolemaic astronomy was remarkably empirically successful, but it suffered a significant explanatory 
failure. Even in antiquity, astronomers and philosophers alike noticed that physical explanations 
depended on the stipulation of a single, universal center, and could not be made to account for a 
descriptive system—like Ptolemy’s—that posited a multiplicity of motions around a multiplicity of 
centers. Nevertheless, the empirical success of Ptolemaic astronomy proved attractive, and the problem 
of multiple centers was explicitly set aside in late antiquity. In the middle ages, however, this “Ptolemaic 
Compromise” was rejected by Arabic philosophers, especially Averroës, who insisted that Ptolemaic 
astronomy could not be reconciled with physical explanations and therefore had to be rejected. The 
problem of multiple centers, they said, could not be surmounted. 
 
A resurgent Averroism in the Renaissance universities where Copernicus studied renewed interest in the 
gaps between Ptolemaic descriptions and physical explanations, especially the problem of multiple of 
centers. Thus, Ptolemaic astronomy’s explanatory failure led Copernicus (and others) to attempt new 
reconciliations between observational astronomy and physics. In fact, Copernicus was a somewhat 
conservative Averroist. He did not reject Ptolemy outright, as did some of his peers. Instead, he tried to 
preserve as much as possible of the Ptolemaic system, rejecting only equants, which he thought were 
too egregious departures from the physical “first principles” of astronomy. In the end, Copernicus did 
not solve the problem Averroës had raised. Like Ptolemy, he posited a multiplicity of centers, contrary to 
the demands of Aristotelian physics. Subsequent authors continued to struggle with the explanatory 
problem of multiple centers in Copernicus’s heliocentric astronomy, and were thus led to seek novel and 
ultimately non-Aristotelian explanations of the heavens and the natural world—ones that did not 
depend on the stipulation of a center at all. A change of descriptions to save explanations led to changes 
of explanations to save descriptions. 
 
This historical discussion integrates several issues in the philosophy of science regarding scientific 
epistemology and scientific change. In particular, notice the layered model of scientific knowledge at 
work. Scientific theories, insofar as they are attempts to explain natural phenomena, necessarily involve 
two distinct epistemic levels: explanatory principles and descriptions. Explanatory principles have no 
explanatory force—they are not explanations of anything at all—unless they are coordinated to some 
feature of the world by a description. One must specify what is happening before once can attempt to 
say why it is happening. Descriptions are part of a theory. They are necessary to bring phenomena under 
explanations, and thus necessary to make them intelligible. 
 
This layered model of scientific theory leads, in turn, to a characterization of scientific change. To change 
a theory is to alter either epistemic layer within it. A new theory is generated by altering either 
descriptions or explanations. In both cases, the phenomena are made intelligible anew. Thus, a scientist 
might respond to the failures of a prior theory in a variety of ways. She might alter explanations to make 
phenomena intelligible as previously described. She might alter the descriptions of the phenomena to 
bring them into line with explanations. Copernicus pursued this last option in the face of the explanatory 
failure of Ptolemaic astronomy, though he inspired subsequent authors to follow the first option—new 
explanations—to solve explanatory failures in his own theory. 
 
